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I talian Declaration, 1915.
The Government of the Hepublic willuot to1era te a uy
frmn the principles flowing from neutrality .
PoRT-AU-PRINCE,

October 3,

dPpH t'(HI'•!

1914~

ITALY.
WAR DECLARATIONS.
Declaration of war aga-inst Atlstria-Hungary, .Jlay 23 , 1915.

1

[2nd Austro-Hungarian Red Book.]
No. 204.-Baron Burian to "Baron Macchio.

[Telegram.]
VIENNA,

JJJay 23, 1915.

The Duke of Avarna this afternoon handed to 1ne the following declaration of war :
[Translation from the French.]

In cmnpliance with the orders of his noble SoYereign the IGng,
the undersigned Royal Italian ambassador has the honor to colnhl.lmicate the following to his excellency the Austro-Hungariau
minister of foreign affairs :
On the 4th of this month the Austro-Hungarian Govern1nent
was informed of the grave reasons for which Italy, confident of
being in the right, declared that her alli~nce \vith AustriaETungary was null and void, and without effect in future, since
this alliance had been violated by the Austro-IIungarian Government, and that Italy resumed her full freedom of action. Fully
determined to protect Italian rights and interes_ts \vith all .:the
means at its disposal, the ·Italian Government can not evade its
duty to take such measures as events may impose upon it against
all present and future menaces to the fulfillment of Italy's national aspirations. His Majesty the King declares that from tomorrow he will consider himself in a state of war with Austriaflungary.
The undersigned has the honor at the same time to inform hisexcellency the minister of foreign affairs that to-day the AustroHungarian ambassador in Rome will receive his passports, and he
\vould be grateful if his execellency would hand him likewise his
own passports.
1 San Marino is reported to have declared war upon Austria-Hungary
June 3, 1915. (American Year Book, 1915, p. 813; Am. Jour. Int. Law,.
9: 27.)

I tali an l\l otification, 1915.

1 G-±

Notification of war with A.ustria-Hungary, ]!Jay 23, 1915.1
ritalian Green Book.]
No. 77, Annex 2.-Note of Baron Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister.

[Communicated to Italian representatives abroad and _to foreign Govern·
ments - on May 23, 1915.]
·

ROME,

1liay 23, 1915.

A clear proof of the e1ninently con~rvative and defensive cbaru.cter of the triple alliance is to be found in the letter and spirit of
the treaty, anLl in the policy clearly n1an~fested and confirmed by
the official acts of the ministers who created the alliance and who
·w ere respqnsible for its renewals.
' Italian policy has ever been inspired -vvith the idears of peace.
Austria-Hungary, in provoking a European war, in refusing to
accept Serbia's reply ·which gave Austria-Hungary all the satisfacti_on whic11 she could legitimately demand, in refusing to listen
to the conciliatory proposals which Italy had made in conjunction
with other powers in order to preserve Europe from an immense
conflict, which would drench it in blood and pile up ruins on a
scale hitherto unknown and undrean1ed of-Austria-Hungary tore
up with her own hands the treaty of alliance -vvitlt Italy, which;
so long as it was loyally interpreted other than as an instrument
of -aggression against others, had been a valuable factor in
eliminating and settling disputes, and in securing for 1nany years
to cmne the inestilnable benefits of peace.
The first article of the treaty reafiinned the logical and general
principle of every treaty of alliance, na1nely, the obligation to
exchange views on political· and econo1nic questions of a general
nature -vvhich Inight arise. It followed that neither contracting
party \\'as at liberty to undertake, without previous 1nutual agreement, action by which the other contracting parties might incur
any obligation under the treaty of alliance, and in any way affect
t heir n1ost ilnportant interests. Austria-Hungary, by sending
her note of July 23, 1914, to Serbia without previously consulting
Italy failed in this duty; Austria-Hungary thus violated unquestionably one of -the funda1nental clauses of the treaty. AustriaHungary was all the 1nore under the obligation to consult Italy
first, inas1nuch as her uncompromising action against Serbia had
created a situation directly tending to provoke a European war,
and as early as the .beginning o:E July, 1914, the Royal Government, who were anxious in regard to the way
were shaping
,. things
'
at Vienna, had repeatedly counseled 1noderation, and had warned
the Imperial and Royal Government of the possible danger of a
general European crisis.
1

See also Journal Officiel, May 27, 1915, p. 3335.
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The _action taken by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was, moreoYer, directly in opposition to Italian general political and economic interests in the Balkan Peninsula. It is not possible that
Austria could have thought that Italy would remain indifferent to
any din1inution of Serbian independence. Our warnings had not
been lacking on this point. For many years Italy had frmn time
to tilne warned Austria, in friendly but unequivocal terms, that
she considered the independence of Serbia an essential factor in
the balance of power in the Balkans, which Italy herself could
never allo\v to be disturbed to her detriment. And this spirit was
not' only expressed in the private conversations of her diplomats,
but her states1nen proclailned it loudly and publicly in her Parliament.
'Vhen, in delivering an ultimatum to Serbia, Austria not only
failed-in defiance of all custom-to consult us beforehand, but
used every effort to conceal it from us, so that we only heard of
it simultaneously with the public through the telegraphic agencies
before we were informed diplomatically, she not only placed herself outside the alliance with Italy but showed herself an enemy
of Italian interests.
It became clear to the Royal Government, frorri trustworthy
information in their possession, that the whole trend of AustroHungarian action in the Balkans would lead to a very serious
impairment' of the political and economic position of Italy, because it airned directly or indirectly at the subjugation of Serbia,
the political and territorial isolation of 1\1ontenegro, and theisolatiun of Rumania and the diminution of her political importance. This impairment of Italy's position in the Balkans
would have been brought about even if Austria-Hungary had had
no idea of territorial aggrandizement. It is sufficient to remark
that the Austro-Hungarian Government were under an express
obligation to take Italy into consultation by virtue of a special
article of the treaty of the triple alliance, which established the
bond of a defensive agreement and the right to cmnpensa tion
among the allies in the case of the temporary or permanent
occupation of any part of the Balkans. The Royal Govern1nent
besan conversations on. the subject \Vith the Imperial and Royal
Gov1~rnment· immediately at 'the beginning of hostile action by
Austria-Hungary ag~.inst Serbia, receiving, after smne reluctance,
an adhesion in principle.
Those conversations were begun immediately after July 23,
with a view to giving to the treaty, which had been violated and
therefore annulled by the~ action of Austria-Hungary, a new element of life, which could only be effected by the conclusion of
ne\V agreements.
Conversations were. reopened on a rather more definite basis
in the month of December, 1914. The royal ambassador at
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Vienna then received instructions to infonn Count Berchtold that
the Italian Governn1ent considered it necessary to proceed without any delay to an exchange of ideas, with a view to negotiating
-with the Governn1ent on concrete points in order to clear up the
\vhole situation arising out of the conflict provoked by AustriaHungary. Count Berchtold refused at first, on the. ground that
he did not think it was necessary, in the present circumstances,
to enter into negotiations. But in consequence of our reply, with
·which the Ger1nan Government associated themselves, Count
Berchtold subsequently informed us that he was ready to enter
into the exchange of ideas which we had proposed.
We accordingly immediately set out the fundamental broad
lines of our point of view, that is to say, we declared that the
c9mpensation that vve had in n1ind as affording the basis of a .
possible agreement 1nust envisage territories now under the domination of Austria-Hungary.
The discussions continued from 1nonth to month from the beginnjng of December until March, and it was not until the end
of Mar~h that Baron Burian made us an offer of a zone of territory extending slightly to the north of the town of Trent. In
return for this cession Austria-Hungary demanded from. us in
her turn numerous reciprocal engagements, including full and
complete freedotn of action in the Balkans.
It should be noted that the Austro-Hungarian Govern1nent did
not contemplate that the cession of territory in the Trentino
should ·be effected hnmediately, as we had de1nanded, but only at
the end of the present war. vVe replied that we could not J?Ossibly
accept the offer, and we forn1ulated the minimum concessions
that would be in any way consistent both with our national aspirations and with the improvement of our strategical position on
the Adriatic. Such require1nents included a smnewhat larger district of the Trentino, a new district on . the Isonzo, the special
treatlnent of Trieste, the cession of so1ne islands of the Curzolari
Archipelago, a declaration of Austria's disinterestedness in Albania, and the recognition of our possession of Valona and the Dod·
ekanese.
All our requests 1net at first with ~ categorical refusal. It was
only after another 1nonth of conversations that Austria-Hungary
\vas ind ucecl to increase the zone of terri tory to be ceded in the
Trentino, setting the lilnit at Mezzolombardo, but excluding
Italian districts, as, for instance, the whole side of the Valley of
Noce, the Val di Fassa, and the Val di Ampizzo, and leaving us
a boundary \Vhich clid not correspond in any way to strategical
require1nents. Moreover, the Austrian Government firmly adhered to their refusal to 1nake any cession effective before the
end of the \var. The repeated refusals of Austria-Hungary were
explicitly confir1ned in a conversation between Baron Burian and

.clccount of Au.stro-ltaUan Negotiations .
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the royal an1bassa<1or at Vienna on April 29 last, the upshot of
which was that the Austro-Hungarian Govern1nent, while admitting the possibility of recognizing to a certain extent our preponderant interest at Valona and the aforesaid cession of territory
in the Trentino, persisted in giving a negative reply to almost all
our other demands, and especially to those regarding the line of
the Isonzo, Trieste, and the islands.
Frmn the attitude adopted by Austria-Hungary from the beginning of December to the end of April it became quite clear that·
she "·as merely trying to temporize without achieving any definite
results. In these circu1nstances Italy found herself face to face
with the danger that all her aspirations, whether traditional or
ethnical, and her desire for security on the Adriatic, would be
lost forever, while on· the other hand the European war menaced
her· highest interests in other seas.
Owing to this fact it became at once a duty and a necessity for
Italy to recover the liberty of action which \vas her right, and to
seek to preserve her interests by other 1neans than those e1nployed
in the negotiations fruitlessly pursued for five months; and by
other means than through the treaty of alliance, which by the
action of Austria-Hungary had virtually been at an end since
.July, i914.
It will not be inappropriate to observe that once the alliance
had come to an end there was no longer any reason for the
Italian people to maintain the attitude of acquiescence which had
been dictated by their sincere desire for peace nor to repress any
longer-as they had so long forced themselves to do~the indignation caused by the treatment to which the Italian population in
Austria was subjected. It is true the treaty contained no formal
provision for safeguarding the Italian language, traditions, or
civilization in the regions inhabited by our compatriots in AustriaHungary.
But ·since it "·as sought to give to the alliance an appearance ·Of
sincere peace and harmony, it is obvious that there was a moral
obligation on the part of our ally to pay strict regard to and
sc-rupulously to respect the vital interests involved for us in the
Tacial distribution on the Adriatic coast.
As a matter of fact, the constant policy of the Austro-Hungarian
Government aimed for many years at the destruction of Italian
nationality and civilization along the coast of the Adriatic. It
will only be necessary to give a few short instances of facts and
tendencies already too well known to everyone; systematic substitution for officials of Italian nationality of officials of other nationalities; the importation of hundreds of. families of different nationality; the creation at Trieste of cooperative societies of foreign
workmen; the Hohenlohe decrees which aimed at excluding all
Italian officials from the public life of Trieste; the denationaliza-
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tion of the judicial administration; the question ·o f the university t'
whch formed t]1e subject of diplomatic negotiations; the denationalization of the steamship companies; the action of the police and
political trials tending to favor other nationalities at the expe'nse· ..
of the I-talians; the systematic expulsion of Italians, wholly unjustified and constantly increasing in number.
The unchanging policy of the Imperial and Royal Government
toward the subject Italian population was not solely inspired by
internal motives due to the existence of contending nationalities
within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but appears, on the contrary, to have been caused in great part by a deep~rooted sentiment
of hostility and aversion for Italy, which prevails in certain circles.
which are in close touch vvith the Austro-Hungarian Government,
and which have a dominating influence on its decisions. li~rmn
among many proofs of this which could be cited, it may suffice to·
mention that in1911, while Italy was engaged in war with Turkey,
the general staff at Vienna made preparations that grew more·
and more -obvious for an attack upon us, and the military party
made most active attempts to win over to its views the other factors responsible for the action of the monarchy.
At the same time the anned preparations on our frontier assuined an openly offensive character. The crisis came to a pacific
solution, as far as can be judged, owing to the influence of external factors. But from that tirne onward we have ·remained under'
the ilnpression that we might unexpectedly find ourselves exposed
to armed menace \vhenever the party hostile to us might obtain
predominance at Vienna. All this was knovvn to Italy, but (as
has been said before) a sincere desire for peace prevailed among
the Italian people.
When new conditions caine into existence_ Italy tried to see
whether, even under such circumstances, it might be possible to
find a more solid basis and a 1nore durable guarantee for her
treaty vvith Austria-Hungary. But her endeavors, conducted over
a p~riod of many months in constant accord with Germany, ·who
agreed that negotiation ·was legitimate, were spent in vain. Hence
Italy has found herself forced by the course of events to seek
other solutions, and since the treaty of alliance with AustriaHungary had already virtually ceased to exist, and no\V only
served to cloak the real situation-one of continual suspicions
and daily differences-the royal ambassador at Vienna was instructed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the
Italian Government considered itself freed fro1n any binding
power of the treaty of triple alliance as far as Austria-Hungary
was concerned. This con1munication \vas made at Vienna on
l\iay 4.

After this declaration on our. part, and after vve had been forced
to proceed to the legitimate protection of our o\vn interests, the

lVotification oJ War

~with

7'wrlcey.
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Imperial and Royal Government made new offers of inadequate
concessions, which in no sense· corresponded to the 1ninimun1 demands of our former proposals. These offers could in no wise be
accepted by us. The Royal Government, considering all that has
been set forth above, strengthened by the votes of Parliament and
by the solemn n1anifestations of the nation, has resolved to make
an end of delays, and on this day has declared to the AustroHungarian ambassador at Rome, in the name of the I\::ing, that
Italy considers herself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary
fro1n to-morrow, l\1ay 24. Instructions in the same sense were
telegraphed yesterday to the royal ambassado1~ at Vienna.
SoNNINo.
Notification of war with Turkey, noon, Augttst 21, 1915. 1
File No. 763.72/2052.
The italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of the United States.·

[Translation.]

No. 2651.]

ITALIAN EMBASSY,
Beverly Fanns, J.l!ass., August 21, 1.915.

l\Ir. SECRETARY oF STATE: I have the honor by order of n1y GoYerninent to bring the following to your excellency's knowledge.
Fr01n the elate of the signature of the treaty of peace of
Lausanne, on October 18, 191_2, the Ottoman Govenunent has been
violating that treaty and the violations have not ceased for an
instant until now.
As a 1natter of fact the Imperial Governn1ent never adopted
in earnest any n1easure to bring about the immediate cessation
of hostilities in Lybia, as it was bound to do u.n der its covenants
sole1nnly entered into; and it did nothing toward the release
of the Italian prisoners of war. The Ott01nan soldiers re1naining
in Tripoli and Cyrenaica were kept there under co1n1nand of· their
own· officers, continuing to use the Ottoman flag, holding possession of their rifles and cannons. Enver Bey continued to
direct in person the hostilities against the Italian Army until the
end of November, 1912, and Aziz Bey did not leave those parts
with 800 men of the regular forces until June, 1913; 'rhe way in
Yvhich both these com1nanders were received on their return to
Turkey is proof evident that their acts were fully assented to
by the imperial authorities. After Aziz Bey's departure, on the
other hand, officers of the Turkish Army continued to find their
1 " The Royal Italian ambassador at Paris made known on the 29th
August, 1915, that the Royal Italian Government declared war on Turkey on the date of Aug. 20, 1915, at 12 o'clock noon." (Journ. OII., Aug.
31' 1915, p. 6107.)
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way into C;yrenaica. On this very <lay there are nwre than a
hunc1rec1 there whose na1nes are known to the Italian Govepunent.
In April last 35 young men frmn Benghazi. whmn Enver Bey had
taken to Constantinople against the will of the Royal GovernInent and who \Vere -there achnitted into the 1nilitary acaden1y
\Yere sent back to Cyrenaica ·without our knowledge. Again the
K:ing's Govern1nent positively knovvs, any declaration to the contrary notwithstanding, .that the holy war was also proclaimed
against the Italians in Africa in 1914. And a mission of Turkish
officers and soldiers bearing gifts to the Senussi chiefs in rebellion against the Italian authorities in Lybia were recently captured by French warships.
The relations of peace and friendship which the Italian Governn1ent thought it could establish with the Otto1nan GovernInent after the treaty of Lausanne therefore never existed, through
the latter's fault. And after every diplon1atic representation
against violations of the'treaty had proved utterly useless there
remained nothing for the Royal Government to do but to provide
otherwise for the safeguard of the high interests of the State and
the defense of its colonies against the pers~stent 1nenace and the
actual acts of hostility on the part of the o·ttoman Government.
It beca1ne all the more necessary and urgent to reach a decision,
as the. Ottoman Government quite recently committed patent invasions of the rights, "interests, and very freedom of Italian citizens in the Empire, the more energetic protests entered on this
point by the King's ambassador at Constantinople being of no
avail. In the presence of the tergiversations of the Ottoman
Govenunent on the specific point of letting Italian citizens freely
depart from Asia Minor, these protests had, in these last few
days, to assume the for_m of an ultilnatum. · On the 3d. of the
1nonth the royal . ambassador at Constantinople addressed by
order of the Royal Government a note to the Grand Vizier setting forth the following four demands :
1. -That the Italians be free to leave Beirut.
2. That the Italiaps in Smyrna, the port of Vourla being unavailable, be allovved to leave by way of Sigadjik.
3. That the Ottoman Govern1nent let Italians embark unmolested frmn Mersina, Alexandretta, Cai-ffa, and Jaffa.
4. That the local authorities in the interior stop opposing the
departure of ·royal subjects proceeding to the coast, and, on the
contrary, endeavor to facilitate their journey.
On 'the 5th of August, before the expiration of the term of 48
hours set in the Royal Government's ultimatum, the Otto1nan
Governn1ent, in a note signed by the Grand Vizier, accepted every
point in the Italian demands. On the strength of such solemn
dec1 ara tions the I(ing's Government arranged to send two ships
to llhodes with instructions to await orders t~ proceed and take
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on board the Italian citizens, who for som~ thne had been stayill.g
in the above-named ports of Asia l\linor, until they could return
home. But now it appears frmn reports of the American consular
officers whom the United States GoYernment has graciously authorized to assume the protection of Italian interests at various
posts that the Turldsh 1nilitary authority at Beirut canceled on
the 9th instant the pennit to leave granted but a short time
before. It was likewise canceled at l\lersina. It was further
announced that the Ottoman 1nilitary authorities had opposed
the e1nbarkation of other Italians residing in Syria.
In the presence of this patent breach of categorial promises
made by the Ottoman Governn1ent in consequence of the Italian
GoYernment's ultinulttup the Royal GoYenunent has issued instructions to His l\Iajesty's mnbassador at Constantinople to deliver a declaration of war on Turkey. And the declaration of
\Var was delivered this day at Constantinople to the Ottoman Government by the I{:ing's a1nbassador.
Accept, etc.,
v. MACCHI DI CELLERE.
Notification of a state of war with Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.
[Rev. Gen., Doc. 23: 150.]

Bulgaria having opened hostilities against Serbia in allying
itself with the enemies of Italy and in combating the allies, the
Italian Government has, by order of the I\:ing, declared that a
state of war exists between Italy and Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.
Notification of war with Gennany, August 28, 19i6. 1
The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of the United States.

[Translation.]

ROYAL ITALIAN EMBASSY, _
Beverly Fanns, August 28, 1916.
Mr. SECRETARY oF STATE: I have the honor to address the following communication to your excellency in the name of the
King's Government:
Systematically hostile acts on the part of the German Government to the detriment of Italy have succeeded one another ·with
increasing frequency, consisting in both an actual ·warlike participation and economic measures of every kind.
'Vith regard to the for1ner, it will suffice to 1nention the -reiterated supplies of arms and of instnunents of war, terrestrial
1

See also Journal Officiel, Aug. 31, 1916, p. 7831.
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and 1naritirne, furnished by Germany to Austria-Hungary, . antl
the uninterrupted pa:r;ticipation of German officers, soldiers, and
seamen in the various operations of \Var directed against Italy. 1
In fact, it is only thanks to the assistance afforded her by Gerrnany in the most varied forms that Austria-Hungary has recently
been able to concentrate her most extensive effort against Italy.
It is also worth while to recall the transmission, by the German
Government to Austria-Hungary, of the Italian prisoners who
had escaped frmn the Austro-Hungarian concentration carnps and
taken refuge in German territory.
Arnong the measures of an econmnic character ·which were
hostile to Italy it ·will be sufficient to cite the invitation \Vhich, at
the· instance of the imperial department of· foreign affairs, wa~
directed to Gennan credit institutions and bankers to consider
every Italian citizen as a hostile foreigner and to suspend payn1ents due him; also the suspension of payment to Italian laborers
of the pensions clue them by virtue of the formal provisions of
the German law.
The Governrnent ·of His Majesty the l{ing did not think that
it could longer tolerate such a state of things, which aggravates,
to the exclusive detriment of Italy, the sharp contrast between
the "'de facto and the de jure situation alrea.dy arising from the
fact of the alliance of Italy and of Germany with two groups of
nations at war among one another.
For these reasons the Royal Government has, in the name of
his.lVIajesty the l{ing, notified the German Government through
the Swiss Government that, as from to-day, August 28, Italy
considers herself in a state of war \Vith Germany.
Please accept, etc.,
MACCHI DI CELLERE .

•
BLOCKADES AND NAVIGATION RESTRICTIONS.
Notification of declaration of blockade of Austria-Hungary and
Albania, 111cly 26, 1915. 2
tJ·ournal Officiel, June 3, 1915, p. 3549.]

The Royal Italian Government, in view of the state of war
existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary, considering that the
1

In an opinion of the German Reichsgericht .at Leipsic, shortly before
the war, appears the statement: "Formally there is not a state of war
between Germany and Italy, but it must be admitted nevertheless that
Germany participates in the Austro-Italian War in consequence of the
treaties existing between Austria· and Germany.
According to these
treaties, in case Austria is obliged to send troops to other theaters of
the war, Germany should fill the vacancies thus caused by means of
proper forces."
(Journal du droit international p.rive. (Clunet), 43:
1701.)
.
2 " A dispatch from Vienna says that Austria-Hungary sent on June 9,
1H15, to foreign powers a note protesting against the blockade of Albania
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Austro-Hungarian naval authorities 1nake use of some ports of
the Albanian coast for clandestinely supplying their navy, declare
that, starting fr01n l\1ay 26 :
1. The Austro-Hungarian coast, extending from the Italian frontier at the north to the l\fontenegrin frontier at the south, \Vith all
it'-; ports, isles, harbors, roadsteads, creeks;
2. The coast of Albania, extending from the Montenegrin frontier at the north to and including Cape Kiephali 1 at the south
will be held in a state of effective blockade by the Italian naval
forces.
The geographical lilnits of the blockaded territory will be the
following:
For the Austro-Hungarian coast: Northern limit, 45° 42' 50"
north latit-ude and 13° 15' 10" east longitude (Greenwich) ;
southern limit, 42°- 6' 25;' north latitude and 19° 5' 30" east longitude (Greenwich).
Vessels of friendly or neutral powers \Viii have a time, which
will be fixed by the commander in chief of the Italian naval forces, •
after the date of the declaration of blockade to freely leave the
blockaded zone.
All vessels which, in violation of blockade, atte1npt to cross or
have crossed the barred line, established between the Cape of
Otrante and the Cape of Kiephali will be proceeqed against according to the rules of international la\Y and to treaties in force.
Notification of declaration of blockade of Albania, ]Jay 30, 1915.
[Rev. Gen., Doc. 22: 215.

See also London Gazette, June 4, 1915,
p. 5386.]

The Royal Government declares that the blockade of the coast
of Albania which, by the declaration of l\1ar 26~ \Vas established
from ~fontenegro at the north to Ca11e I\::iephali at the south is
by Italy and declaring that this blockade is contrary to· the sovereign
rights of a State whose neutrality Italy expressly recognized at the conference of ambassadors at London in 1913. The blockade is also contrary to the first article of the Declaration of London of Feb. 26, 1909,
since the Austrian Army and Navy do not occupy a part of Albania,
nor do they use the Albanian ports as bases of supply _for the Austrian
Navy. Finally, the blockade is not valid because it is contrary to the
Declaration of London that the Austro-Hungarian local authorities have
not received notification of the blockade." (London, June 12, H.l15,
Clunet, 42 : 266.)
1 "The blockade of the coast of Albania by Italy, south to the Cape
of Kiephali, has been considered, in the midst of Greek politics, as being
the result of an error. In effect it would result that all the coast of
Chimara, which was made part of the Epire if the north, actually
occupied by Greece with the assent of the powers, would be blockaded.
The territory to the north of Epire enjoyed, by the very faCt of its
occupation by Greek troops, the same r.eutrality as the Hellenic king1
dolJI nnd can not consequently be submitted to any blockade." (Temps,
).Jay 30, 19J 5; Rev. Gen., Doc. 22 :215.) See following text.
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reduced frmn the 30th ::\lay, fron1 the sa1ne (northern limits) t o
Aspri R uga.
Con sequently the geographic lilnits of the blockade of Alba11 ian
t erritory are the folloydng : Northern limit, 41 o 52' north latitude- and 19° 22' 40" east longitude (Greenwich) ; southern lhnit,
40° 9' 36" north latitude, 19° 35' 45" east longitude (Greenwich).
rrhe new barred line, established between the Cape of Otrante and
Aspri Ruga will form the line of blockade, with all the effects of
the declaration of lVlay 26, 1915.
The period conceded to vessels of friendly and neutral powers
to leave the blockade zone has been fixed by the commander in·
chief of the Italian. naval forces at 10 days from the date of the
declaration of blocka de.
Notification relating to n aviga tion of the . Strait of Messina, },fay
30, 191'5.
[Journal Officiel,

Jun~ ~'

1915, p. 3518.]

Navigation in the Strait of Messina is forbidden three-quarters
of an hour after sunset until a half hour before sunrise..
Navigation is permitted in the day in clear weather; under
r eservation of the prescriptions in force in reference to war vessels, torpedo boats, and sub1narines of the national or allied navies,
it is ordered that all national, allied, and neutral merchant vessels
await authorization before navigating the strait, vessels coming ·
fro1n the north to stop on the 1neridian of Forte-Apuria, at least
3 miles away, and to exchange signals ·with the semaphore; those
coming from the south to stop on the 1neridian of Cape Dell Armi
and to observe the same prescriptions.
Notification, blockade of the Adriatic, July 6, 191-ti.
[London Gazette, July 23, 1915, p. 7190; Journal Officiel, Julv .17, 1915,
p. 4857.]

The secretary of state for foreign affairs has received from His
Majesty's a.mbassador at Rome the following translation of a
Royal decree, dated July 4, and published in the Italian Official
Gazette of the 8th :
ARTICLE 1. The blockade declared by the Royal Government on
the 26th and 30th May, is extended to the whole zone of the
Adriatic Sea to the north of the Otrante-Aspri-Ruga ( Strade
Bianchi) line.
Consequently, the navigation in the Adriatic Sea to the north
of this line by merchant ships of any nationality is forbidden.
ART. 2. The minister of marine or authorities delegated by him
may, nevertheless, grant after necessary inquiries, special safe
conduct to merchant ships desirous of proceeding to ports belong.
ing to or occupied by Italy or Montenegro.
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Vessel':; desirous of entering the Adriatic must proceed to Ga llipoli (Apulia), where the safe conducts of enti·y must be ohtained.
For leaving the Adriatic, vessels after having r eceive<l pel'mi ssion at the port of departure 1nust proceed to Bari, wher e they
·w ill be furni shed with the safe conducts of departure.
Yessels provided with safe conducts 1nust cross the blockade
line, Otrante-Aspri-Ruga ( Str~de Bianchi) during daytime only.
They must stop on that line at a distance not greater than 5
miles from the Italian shore, •to be visited by the men of war
destined for that purpose.
ART. 3. The rules laid down in our decree of June 13, 1915, No.
899, as well as any special regulations which the naval authorities 1nay think fit to enforce on vessels entering or leaving the
Adriatic, 1nust be observed by all n1erchant vessels of whatever
nationality navigating in the Adriatic, in the circu1n~tances
provided for in Article 2.
ART. 4. Vessels contravening the rules laid down in tlle preceding articles ··will be considered guilty of violation of blockade/ and
are liable to capture and confiscation, together with their cargo,
according to the regulations in force.
ART. 5. The present decree will c6me into force on July 6, 1915.

JAPAN.
Ulti1natunt to Gcnnany,

A~tgust

15, 191.1.

[Official Japanese Documents; See also Austro-Hungarian Red Bool•
No. 66.]
No. 3.-Telegram dispatched by the Imperial Japanese Government to thecharge d'affaires ad interim at Berlin on August 15, 1914.

You are hereby instructed to address to Herr von Jago·w inunediately on receipt of this telegran1 a signed note to the following
effect:
The undersigned, charge d'affaires ad interiln of His Majesty
the Emperor-of Japan, has the honor in pursuance of instructions .
from hjs· Government to comn1unicate to his excellency, the Ininist<:>r for foreign affairs of His l\Iajesty, the Genn'an E1nperor t o the.
fo11o,ving effect:
Considering it highly important and necessary in the present
~ ituation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to
the pea ce of th~ Far East and to safeguard the general interests
contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and
Great Britian in order to secure a fir1n and enduring peace in ·
c:1stern Asia, which is the aim of the said agreement, the llnperial
Japanese Government sincerely believe it th~ir duty to give advice

